Production Readiness Report

Final deliverable of the Phase 2 Beta Launch validation pass. Synthesizes Phases 1-6 (code audit, broker verification, stress testing, security audit, deployment review, launch documentation) into one assessment. Every claim below links to the document where it was actually established — this report doesn't introduce new claims of its own.

Overall readiness score

Code & architecture: 9/10. Operationally validated for launch: 6/10. Two different numbers on purpose — collapsing them into one would either overstate what's been verified or understate how mature the codebase actually is.

Why code/architecture scores high: every feature area audited this pass was already substantively complete before this pass started (this pass found genuine gaps, but small ones relative to the system's size — one duplicated file, two dead components, two query optimizations, one missing Docker service, 13 dependency CVEs in one third-party SDK's transitive tree). RLS coverage is 47/47 tables. Test coverage is 1,132 passing tests plus 474 connector-specific tests. Every known limitation in this codebase is *documented*, not hidden — a pattern this pass found consistently applied, not just in the areas it touched.

Why operational readiness is lower, and this is the number that actually matters for "can we accept paying users now": this environment cannot perform three categories of validation no amount of code review substitutes for — live broker account testing, real database load testing, and an actual Docker build. None of these are signs of a broken system; they're signs of what a sandboxed code-review pass structurally cannot do. See docs/BETA_LAUNCH_CHECKLIST.md for the complete, actionable breakdown of what's blocking vs. not.

Remaining risks

Ranked by actual severity, not by document section:

1. No connector has been tested against a real broker account, ever, in this codebase's history. The single largest risk to real money. Every connector is built against verified real API schemas/SDKs, not guesses — but "verified against documentation" and "confirmed working against a live account" are different claims, and only the first has been made honestly throughout. Mitigation: run docs/BROKER_INTEGRATION_REPORT.md's Validation Checklist against a real demo account per broker before launch. 2. 13 dependency vulnerabilities (2 critical) in `metaapi.cloud-sdk`'s transitive tree, not fixable without either an upstream SDK update or a live-MT5-retested override. Mitigation: docs/ SECURITY_REVIEW.md §14's staged remediation path — a decision, not a fix, is the minimum required action before launch. 3. Real database performance under concurrent load is completely unmeasured. docs/STRESS_TEST_REPORT.md's numbers are real but explicitly exclude Postgres round-trip latency and connection-pool behavior — the biggest unknown for how this app actually behaves under real user load. Mitigation: a staging-environment load test before scaling past a small beta. 4. The Docker deployment (including this pass's own `copy-worker` fix) has never been built. Reviewed carefully, not guessed, but "reviewed" isn't "verified." Mitigation: one real docker compose up before production use. 5. No horizontal sharding for the Copy Engine worker exists yet — the numbers to plan it are now real (Phase 3), the sharding logic itself isn't built. Only a risk at meaningful concurrent-user scale, not for an initial beta. 6. The disaster recovery plan is real but unrehearsed. Standard pre-launch risk for any first version of a DR plan, named rather than assumed away.

Known limitations (carried forward honestly, not new to this pass)

• Rithmic: architecturally complete, wire transport genuinely

unimplemented (not just untested) — do not offer at launch.

• Push notifications: architecture-ready, no vendor configured.
• Several per-broker "best-effort" field mappings (DXtrade/Match-Trader

account discovery, DXtrade SL/TP-price-only, cTrader equity-equals- balance) — each individually documented in docs/BROKER_INTEGRATION_REPORT.md, none of them silent.

• No general public REST API — the product surface is the dashboard UI;

the only externally-documented API is the health-check family (docs/API_DOCUMENTATION.md).

• No credential-encryption-key rotation tooling, no AAD binding on

encrypted credentials (docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md §1).

Performance metrics

From docs/STRESS_TEST_REPORT.md (local, synthetic, in-process — see that report for full methodology and what it explicitly does not cover):

Pure risk-calculation baseline: ~34 million iterations/sec (confirms business logic is not the bottleneck at any tested scale). Zero failures at any level. Bottleneck: single-process throughput flattens past ~1,000-2,000 simultaneous events — a horizontal-scaling problem, not a code-quality one.

Security findings

From docs/SECURITY_REVIEW.md (Modules 9 + Phase 4, 14 sections total):

Confirmed correct, no action needed: encryption algorithm/IV/auth- tag handling, API key hashing approach, MFA (delegates to Supabase Auth's own TOTP, not custom), session revocation (SECURITY DEFINER RPCs re-check admin status server-side independently), rate limiting design (DB-backed, fails open on auth flows by deliberate choice, not oversight), JWT handling (getUser(), not the weaker getSession()), RLS (47/47 tables), SQL injection (zero raw SQL anywhere), XSS (zero dangerouslySetInnerHTML), CSRF (Next.js's built-in Origin/Host check, verified working through the actual nginx config), secrets hygiene (zero real secrets ever committed, verified against git history).

Real, unresolved finding: the npm audit results (§4 above) — the one item on this whole report that's a genuine "fix or explicitly accept" decision, not a "already fine" or "already fixed."

Explicitly out of scope for this pass: penetration testing, infrastructure-level security (Supabase project settings, hosting provider secret storage) — code-level review only, stated plainly rather than implied to be covered.

Recommended launch date

Not a specific calendar date — this codebase has no visibility into your team's capacity to complete the three human-in-the-loop items below, and a fabricated date would be worse than an honest "when these are done." What determines it:

1. Live broker validation (§Remaining risks #1) — the pacing item. Budget for however long it takes your team to get demo credentials for each broker you're launching with and run the validation checklist against each — this is inherently sequential per broker, not something to parallelize away. 2. The npm audit decision (§Remaining risks #2) — should take a day or two: check for an upstream metaapi.cloud-sdk update first: if one exists with patched dependencies, this is fast; if not, the override-and-retest path adds another live-MT5 verification pass on top of #1. 3. One real Docker build + a DR rehearsal — both mechanical, probably a day combined once someone with Docker access runs them.

A reasonable target: 1-2 weeks from when live broker credentials become available, assuming #2 resolves quickly. If MT5 is your primary broker and the SDK issue requires waiting on an upstream fix, that timeline is not this codebase's to promise. A small, invite-only beta with users on demo accounts could reasonably start sooner — the launch-blocking items above are specifically about trusting this system with real broker connections and real production scale, not about whether the product itself works (it does, extensively verified this pass).